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Abstract
The Third World can easily experience a form of ghost existence: We speak but are 
not heard. However, in our culture there are a number of trends and positions that 
are relevant to the task of thinking human rights in a new light. Among them, the 
critiques of rationalism advanced by Oswald de Andrade and Luis Alberto Warat in 
Brasil and Argentina—where there is a possibility of integrating the emotions into 
human rights theory. Sharing a preoccupation with those excluded from the ‘world 
order’ and the appeal to sensibility, Subaltern Studies have advanced some insights 
pointing at establishing a link between colonialism, human rights and suffering. This is 
the case in the work of Upendra Baxi, who has made a criticism of Western theorisa-
tions of law and crafted a fruitful encounter between the insights of Subaltern Studies 
and the theory of human rights. 
Key words: Manifesto Antropófago, emotions, legal surrealism, Subaltern Studies, de-
colonial theory, Eurocentrism, human rights.
Resumo
O Terceiro Mundo pode facilmente experimentar uma forma de existência fantasma: nós 
falamos, mas não somos ouvidos. No entanto, na nossa cultura existe uma série de ten-
dências e posições que são relevantes para a tarefa de pensar os direitos humanos sob 
uma nova luz. Entre elas, as críticas do racionalismo propostas por Oswald de Andrade 
e Luis Alberto Warat no Brasil e na Argentina, onde existe a possibilidade de integrar 
as emoções na teoria dos direitos humanos. Compartilhando uma preocupação com 
os excluídos da “ordem mundial” e o apelo à sensibilidade, os Estudos Subalternos têm 
apresentado algumas percepções que apontam para o estabelecimento de uma ligação 
entre o colonialismo, os direitos humanos e sofrimento. Este é o caso da obra de Upendra 
Baxi, que fez uma crítica às teorizações ocidentais do direito e promoveu um encontro 
fecundo entre a percepção dos Estudos Subalternos e a teoria dos direitos humanos.
Palavras-chave: Manifesto Antropófago, emoções, surrealismo jurídico, Estudos Su-
balternos, teoria descolonial, eurocentrismo, direitos humanos.
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The critique of Eurocentrism can lead us to in-
terrogate and stand back from rationalism itself—that 
peculiar species of European thinking and intellec-
tual climate in which human rights theory was engen-
dered—and to refl ect on the role emotions and suffer-
ing can play in the construction of a theory of human 
rights.2 In contemporary thinking it is possible to point 
to a cluster of enquiries that have adopted the world 
system as their fi eld of research, while working in the 
elaboration of a philosophy concerned with ‘the other’ 
and with the thematisation of concepts with emotional 
charge (Ward, 2004, p. 170).3 Thus, the refl ection on 
politics and ethics developed in the context of the cur-
rent process of globalisation has led Derrida to put the 
ideas of friendship and forgiveness at the centre of his 
cosmopolitanism (Derrida, 2001, 1997).4 Perhaps this 
trend in recent philosophy responds to what Gayatri 
Chakravorty has called the need for contemporary 
rights-based cultures to be supplemented by the ‘call of 
the other’ (Chakravorty Spivak, 2003, p. 168). This ori-
entation of critical thinking is part of the contemporary 
‘turn to emotions’, which includes the insights offered 
by the critique of rationalism advanced in Latin America 
by Oswald de Andrade’s Manifesto Antropófago (1928) 
and Luis Alberto Warat’s Legal Surrealism, and by Sub-
altern Studies, in particular the work of Upendra Baxi.5
Latin American thinking—whose existence is still 
in doubt in some quarters as a remaining consequence 
of its colonial past and present—has been kept in the 
boundaries or outside the circuit of the wider contem-
porary debate. It even remains unknown throughout 
Latin America itself due to the high degree of isolation 
in which the cultural life of most of the countries of the 
region carries on still today. However, there are a num-
ber of trends and positions that are relevant to re-think 
human rights in a new light. Among them, the critiques 
of rationalism advanced by Oswald de Andrade and Luis 
Alberto Warat in Brazil and Argentina—where there is 
the possibility of integrating the emotions into human 
rights theory.6 Their criticism of rights starts out from 
a ‘coming back’ to the ‘primitive mentality’ and con-
nects with the inspiration provided by Nietzsche and 
the European aesthetic vanguards of the 20th century. 
Decolonial Theory, in particular the works of Enrique 
Dussel and Walter Mignolo, will also help us to delineate 
a thinking that locates itself in the Third World. 
Sharing a preoccupation with those excluded 
from the ‘world order’ and the appeal to sensibility, 
Subaltern Studies have advanced some insights pointing 
at establishing a link between colonialism, human rights 
and suffering. Subaltern Studies constitute today an im-
portant area of investigation in both social sciences and 
the humanities. Their contributions to the fi eld of his-
tory and cultural studies have been enormous and enjoy 
wide recognition. Less known are their explorations in 
the sphere of the theory of law. This is the case in the 
work of Upendra Baxi, who has offered a criticism of 
Western theorisations of law and crafted a fruitful en-
counter between the insights of Subaltern Studies and 
the theory of human rights.7
The critique of rationalism from the 
perspective of the colonised
As is the case with Nietzsche, Heidegger, Adorno 
and Horkheimer, some thinkers have pursued a critique 
of reason within the European horizon of understand-
ing. The present critique emerges from a different point 
of view or, to be precise, from a different historical and 
geo-political location. It departs from the ‘exteriority’ 
of Europe or ‘the exteriority of the excluded’ (Dus-
sel, 1998, p. 311) — from the position of the colonised 
peoples, or the Third World. From this standpoint, the 
critique of rationalism is not only an epistemological 
issue. At its roots also lies a political impulse, spring-
ing out from a consciousness that looks for autonomy 
and seeks a non-alienated understanding of the world. 
At this junction epistemological and geopolitical mat-
ters fuse, and an intellectual question becomes a politi-
cal one. We are here in the fi eld of what Walter Mignolo 
2 On the connection between human rights and emotions see Rorty (1994) and Barreto (2011a, 2011b).
3 The work of Ian Ward himself can be situated within this trend, particularly his Justice, Humanity and the New World Order (2003).
4 If we are to believe Derrida, deconstruction is not entirely separated from emotions as some of his readers might think: ‘Even if it appears very provocative to say it 
and even if I began by protesting, I think I was wrong. I am very sentimental and I believe in happiness; and I believe that this has an altogether determinant place in my 
work’ (Derrida, 1996, p. 77).  On Derrida and emotions see Terada (2001).
5 The conditions of the encounter between a theorisation made from the perspective of a Latin American questioning and that of Subaltern Studies have been ana-
lysed elsewhere by Ranajit Guha. For Guha (2001, p. 36-37) the common ground of such a meeting lies in the ‘global temporalities’ they share—that of the times of 
postmodernity--and has been described as the ‘convergence’ of two perspectives with distinct characteristics. No less importantly, this relationship can also share the 
rationale of responding to the phenomena of colonialism and imperialism.
6 Another possibility resides in the work of the Chilean philosopher Humberto Maturana (1988, p. 48-50), who speaks about the need for ‘emotioning’ to accompany 
and restrain the monopoly of rational thinking in modern culture.
7 Commenting on the general orientation of perhaps his most famous text Baxi states: “I endeavour, in this work, to articulate a distinctive subaltern perspective on 
human rights futures” (Baxi, 2002a, p. xiii).
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calls the ‘geopolitics of knowledge’ (see Walsh et al., 
2002). Thus, the epistemological critique of rationalism 
is accompanied by an account of the historical and cul-
tural consequences of rationalisation. Modern reason is 
the object of critique because it is a key element in the 
process of domination of the non-European cultures. 
The hegemonic rationalist way of thinking was taken to 
the colonial world by conquistadors, colonisers, priests, 
lawyers, writers, grammarians and philosophers, and 
permeated the Non-European cultures through the 
process of modernisation and cultural domination of 
the life world that has gone on now for 500 years. Not 
only entire continents have been colonised but also lan-
guages, religions, cultures, memory and ways of thinking 
and of representing space, in the wake of the drive to 
refashion life according to the European template.8
Once a consciousness about the wiping out of 
entire indigenous cultures is reached, it is not diffi cult to 
understand the urge experienced by some Latin Ameri-
cans to distance themselves from the hegemonic way of 
thinking, as breaking with the European domination can 
include the questioning of rationalism. A critique of rea-
son in this direction has been attempted by a number of 
theories made in the Third World, which are part of the 
effort to break free from the tutelage and straitjacket of 
European thinking and culture. As the modern European 
model of thinking was, and continues to be, a tool in the 
process of domination and acculturation of the colo-
nised world, Luis Alberto Warat points out in his 1988 
‘Manifesto of Legal Surrealism’ that there is a need for 
challenging ‘the monopoly of reason’, for overthrowing 
the ‘dominant rationalism’ and for ‘subverting Western 
rationality’, a project that could lead to ‘decolonising 
imagination’ (Warat, 1988, p. 2-3, 9-10, 12).9
The imperative of confronting the modern in-
tellectual climate and culture requires reformulating 
received concepts, but also questioning and transform-
ing in a radical way the adopted or imposed structure 
of thinking. Our capacity for dreaming new ideas and 
worlds can be liberated from the confi guration forced 
by colonial rationalisation—the colonisation of non-
European ‘reasons’. The consequence of such an endea-
vour cannot be other than that of intellectual freedom, 
self-development and authenticity. The conversion of 
Western rationality or the disengagement from it oper-
ates as an exercise of ‘resistance to alienation’, or as a 
way of achieving emancipation—of recovering ‘our au-
tonomy’ and of affi rming ‘our singularity’ (Warat, 1988, 
p. 4-5, 10, 15). The historical challenges posed by our 
times, including those of confronting totalitarianism and 
of advancing democracy and human rights, make it nec-
essary ‘to get back to thinking what has been decreed 
unthinkable’ (Warat, 1988, p. 4-15). In this way Warat 
dares to consider the need to ‘embrace an Adamic at-
titude [...] a primitive gaze’, a ‘primitive thought’ or a 
‘primitive mentality’ (Warat, 1988, p. 5, 9).
The same call to overcome the ‘conquering 
thought’ is found in Oswald de Andrade’s idea of philo-
sophical anthropophagi, which he expressed in 1928 as 
a theoretical strategy to deal with invasive European 
culture and which has been described as an ‘indictment 
of Western metaphysics’ (Castro-Kláren, 2000, p. 299). 
In his paradoxically Paris-born ‘Anthropophagite Mani-
festo’ Andrade embraces ‘the primitive mentality’ as his 
own and scolds those who, like the French anthropolo-
gist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, consider non-European or non-
modern ways of thinking inferior: ‘Against all import-
ers of canned consciousness. The palpable existence of 
life. And the pre-logical mentality for Mr. Lévy-Bruhl to 
study’ (Castro-Kláren, 2000, p. 299). Andrade even dis-
putes the modern cultural history of the Americas when 
he provocatively insists: ‘We never admitted the birth of 
logic among us’ (Castro-Kláren, 2000, p. 299). Lévy-Bruhl 
had published in 1910 ‘Les fonctions mentales dans les 
societés inférieures’ and in 1922 ‘La mentalité primitive’, 
in which he studied the so-called pre-logical mentality 
of the ‘primitives’ and described it as a way of thinking 
distant from the principle of non-contradiction. Positing 
an opposition between ‘primitive’ and ‘civilised’ thought, 
Lévy-Bruhl could envisage only one possible outcome 
from this collision: the necessity for the ‘primitive’ to 
evolve towards the ‘civilised’ and to logical thinking—
the savage must be helped to progress and copy the 
‘higher’ mental types observable among the ‘advanced 
peoples’.10
The opposite applies to Andrade’s critique 
of rationalism. His is not only a meta-epistemological 
questioning, but it also follows the impulse to rebuff the 
colonisation of primitive thinking. Andrade takes up ‘ir-
rationalism’ by casting primitive thinking in a positive 
light. Latin America needs to ascertain the value and 
worth of its own way of thinking and to counteract the 
process of rationalisation of its culture.  Andrade de-
clared that his critique of modern reason did not have 
8 On the colonisation of language, memory and the representation of space see Mignolo (2003).
9 I thank Pablo Gheti for having introduced me to the work of Warat.
10 No wonder why, in a critical shift experienced at a late stage of his life, Lévy-Bruhl portrayed the ‘Institut d’ethnologie’ that he founded as ‘a tool at the service of 
colonialism’ (Gaillard, 2004, p. 89).
Barreto | Human Rights and emotions from the perspective of the colonised
Revista de Estudos Constitucionais, Hermenêutica e Teoria do Direito (RECHTD), 5(2):106-115                                    109
guiding ideas: ‘It has only stomach’ (Prado Bellei, 1998, 
p. 91).11 ‘Four centuries of beef! How disgusting’ was one 
of the slogans of the Anthropophagi movement, which 
grew out of Andrade’s manifesto, and in whose rationale 
being European was a synonym of being a ‘beef eater’ 
(Prado Bellei, 1998, p. 93). It is in this sense that the re-
fusal of rationalism becomes part of the emancipatory 
project of decolonisation of Third World cultures and 
thinking. Bellei explains: 
Four centuries of European beef-eating refers to the 
period of civilised, overdressed oppression in which 
the colonisers used enlightened rationality to repress 
and destroy the irrational primitive cultures and peo-
ples that practiced anthropophagi [...] For Andrade, 
what was being repressed was a form of primitive wis-
dom that the Brazilian modernista revolution should 
try to recover, redefi ne [...]  in the preparation of the 
utopian future (Prado Bellei, 1998, p. 93).12
Warat’s characterisation of Western rationality 
substantially coincides with Andrade’s account: ‘Formal 
imagination’ is ‘the basic vocabulary of science and phi-
losophy’ (Warat, 1988, p. 5), and rationalism is a way 
of thinking orientated by logic and coherence as sine 
qua non elements that enable one to arrive at the truth. 
Warat depicts this imbalanced, one-sided emphasis as 
‘logomaniac’ (Warat, 1988, p. 2). The rationalism that was 
developed in Europe has been unwilling to acknowledge 
its local and specifi c genesis. On the contrary, from its 
beginning it has been inclined to claim a universal valid-
ity, which in turn supposes a culture of exclusion. Des-
cartes’ inaugural version of rationalism knew no geo-
graphical or theoretical limits and became hegemonic 
in contemporary culture, despotically putting aside or 
silencing as illegitimate those ways of being and thinking 
in which ‘reason’, or European reason to be precise, was 
not in complete command. Thus, Western rationality is 
accompanied by a peculiar attitude of hostility towards 
difference, in particular towards emotions. Reason, 
‘logocentrism’ or ‘phalogocentrism’ carry an ‘absolute 
power’ (Warat, 1988, p. 12) that tyrannically takes pos-
session of every sphere of culture, driving out emotion 
and the heart, and condemning feelings to exile. 
For Warat (1988, p. 12, 14), the ‘world called Car-
tesian’, or the corpus of modern rationality, can be de-
scribed as a Manichean apparatus that ‘ignores the pas-
sionate subject’ and as a world ‘where one loses also the 
right to passions’. It can also be seen as a hierarchical 
machine that cuts apart human beings into two oppos-
ing fractions, locates reason at the higher level or that 
of the ‘truly human’, while displacing passions, instincts 
and desire to the lower rank of the unworthy (Warat, 
1988, p. 2-3). Ultimately, modern reason is a feature of 
the capitalist culture and it can be described as a ‘market 
rationality that brings about the domination of the logic 
of sentiments’ (Warat, 1988, p. 12-13). By contrast, the 
primitive mentality or ‘late surrealism’ — Warat’s read-
ing of surrealism—entails a ‘revolution out of sentiment’ 
that endeavours to apprehend the world ‘much more by 
means of emotions than by means of thought’ and that, 
while asserting that it is our passions which make us 
human, looks for some rebalancing that brings emotion 
and reason into a fruitful cooperative relation (Warat, 
1988, p. 3, 10, 12). 
Baxi (2002b, p. 113-114) is also aware of the 
criminal record of reason in modern history and of how 
the rationalist climate has determined the substance 
and the form of the dominant theory of human rights. 
The narrative of suffering embedded in the ‘subaltern 
rights-talk’ opposes and supplements the rationalist 
mood of contemporary times and scholarship. One can-
not but experience a strange discordance in listening 
to the voices of sorrow and tragedy as they bounce 
back at the dry and abstract hegemonic discourse on 
democracy and human rights theory, which remains ‘sa-
nitised’ and purged of references to pain. If mentioned, 
suffering is just used as a rhetorical devise and generally 
does not play a crucial role in the construction of theo-
ries. Historically unable to adopt the standpoint of those 
who suffer, Western human rights theory ‘disembodies 
human suffering’ (Baxi, 2002a, p. 14) and neglects the fact 
that the physical consequences of the violation of rights 
are as important as its intellectual and legal connota-
tions (Baxi, 2002a, p. 14). 
The gulf between these two ways of speaking 
about human rights allows distinguishing between the 
discourse of the ‘illustrado’ and ‘literate’—the intellec-
tual of the West—and the narrative of the ‘índio’ and 
‘illiterate’—the victim of colonial violence. In the cur-
rent conditions of globalisation the former articulates 
the discourse of the status quo, while the latter incar-
nates a subversive narrative. The human rights discourse 
characterised by conveying ‘a sense of suffering’ (Baxi, 
2002a, p. xiii) not only challenges but also enriches the 
11 This is not strange to Nietzcshe’s ‘thinking with the guts’.
12 Paradoxically, the work of Andrade is situated within what was called in Brazil the Modernist movement, a name that responds to particularities of the local history 
of literature.
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dominant Western theories of human rights. A ‘fuller ad-
vertence of the voices of human suffering’ will put us 
on the path to make suffering central to the theory of 
rights, which can give origin to a novel paradigm, to a 
‘different kind of theorising’, or to a ‘new episteme’ for 
thinking human rights.13 The critical impulse offered by 
Baxi will help us to think in a new light the human rights 
culture and the ethics of human rights. 
Human Rights culture, suffering and 
the ethics of solidarity
The Subaltern Theory of human rights posits hu-
man rights in the global context and within the dynamics 
of the relationship between empires and colonies—in 
the middle of the violence of colonialism and the re-
sistance to imperialism. What is immediately apparent 
from thinking human rights within the framework of 
the world system and from the standpoint of the Third 
World is that the victims of the violation of human rights 
are not only those that have been objects of abuse by 
nation states within their boundaries. One must also 
number among the damaged individuals, minorities and 
entire peoples trampled down under the advance of the 
empires driven by the search of power and wealth that 
have been engaged in plundering the colonised world 
for fi ve centuries. It is at this point that the insight of the 
legal philosophy elaborated within the fi eld of Subaltern 
Studies can be very enlightening. Developing one of the 
main tenets of Guha’s work according to which Subal-
tern Studies speak from the perspective of the victims, 
the subaltern theory of human rights speaks from the 
point of view of the violated. 
This move is the consequence of an explicit posi-
tioning of the theorist of rights in relation to the victims, 
in which she abandons the cool detachment favoured 
by rationalism, distance and time. Quoting Guha, Baxi 
(2002a, p. xiii) maintains that there is a need for those 
engaged in the elaboration of a theory of rights to in-
corporate a self-awareness about their own place and 
role in history, and about the choices they make when 
considering human rights issues. For those who for geo-
graphical or historical reasons do no fi nd themselves 
already among the subaltern, to think from ‘the stand-
point of the suffering peoples’ (Baxi, 2002a, p. x) encom-
passes a theoretical move that puts them in the position 
or ‘the shoes’ of the victims, and that considers the vio-
lation of the rights and its theorisation from the per-
spective of their experiences and interests.14 For those 
who think of themselves as belonging already to the 
peoples ravaged by colonialism, to think from this point 
of view is to recognise themselves as being one among 
the millions inhabiting the colonised continents and to 
consciously embrace their predicament and hopes. This 
does not imply any sort of identifi cation with the view 
of the victims. While those who think from the Third 
World reclaim to validate their individual and particular 
view as such, the voice of the violated remains multiple 
and complex. Thinking human rights from the point of 
view of the violated neither supposes to speak on their 
behalf nor to represent them in the scholarly or public 
debate.15
Baxi’s introduction of ‘the language of the vio-
lated’ transforms the quality of the human rights dis-
course (Baxi, 2002a, p. 4, 126). Speaking about human 
rights from the perspective of the victim means to cre-
ate a discursivity on human rights that is expressed in 
terms of suffering. One is obliged to face nakedly the 
fact of suffering. For the victims, the violation of their 
rights does not mean fi rst of all the breaching of con-
stitutions or international treaties, nor the negation of 
political ideals or ethical principles. For the victims, vio-
lence has material consequences in the body and mind, 
and is cause of immediate distress and physical or psy-
chological pain.16 The human rights theory can be con-
structed around human and social suffering because ‘the 
authentically subaltern utterance has no other language 
13 In a tone not free of dualist connotations, Baxi says that the ‘recovery of the sense and experience of human anguish provides the only hope there is for the future 
of human rights’ (emphasis added) (Baxi, 2002a, p. v).
14 This shift of attitude can also be accompanied by an intellectual repositioning of the Western subject that takes her from her own context to the context of the 
colonised as a consequence of realising that her supposedly universal ideas do not apply to all cases. The fi rst and perhaps one of the most intriguing experiences of 
this sort may be that of Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca, a member of a Spanish 16th century expedition to the coast of Florida, who lived for eight years among the na-
tives and became a shaman (Cabeza de Vaca, 1964). ‘Cabeza de Vaca’, by the Mexican director Nicolás Echavarría, is a very engaging movie based on his diaries. A more 
contemporary attempt at a similar kind of transposition is that of Miguel Morey in Deseo de Ser Piel Roja. Novela Familiar (1994). I thank José Bellido for bringing this 
book to my attention.
15 Baxi formulates one of the classical questions of Subaltern Studies: ‘On whose behalf may we speak when we speak of human rights?’ Despite assuming a subaltern 
theory of human rights as a sort of voice person of the violated, Baxi recognises that no sophisticated self-comprehension of their role in history can ensure that those 
working under the perspective of the subaltern would be able to convey the complexity, sentiments and direction that arise from the historical fi ght of the peoples 
for human rights (Baxi, 2002a, p. xiii).
16 Operating within the ethos of this language, the contemporary state of affairs of the Third World is characterised by Baxi as one in which a number of generations 
remains condemned to ‘intense suffering’. In a similar way, the social costs of the Cold War and the process of globalisation--the latest expressions of colonialism—are 
defi ned in terms of the suffering caused to the peoples of the Third World.
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that would enable the violated to express this violence’ 
(Baxi, 2002a, p. 126). It is possible to speak about the 
victims of mass killings in the language of statistics or 
in the terms of a political discourse of denunciation 
of injustice. It is also possible to speak about the indi-
vidual victims in terms of legal subjects whose rights 
have been infringed. However, the introduction of the 
language of the victims, an operation that encompasses 
a true ‘blood transfusion’, can supplement the discourse 
of the reconstruction of the history of a people, as well 
as the jargon in which reports on human rights abuses 
are written. The language of suffering is the immediate 
and sometimes the only speech or meaningful utterance 
available to those tormented by the torturers, to the 
mother facing the disappearance of her son, to the child 
who knows his father has been killed. Pain is also what 
generations have felt when they have been hammered 
by the diverse forms that the violence of imperialism 
has adopted over the centuries all over the geography 
of the South. 
The language of suffering corresponds to the 
common sense of the victims, but it has not been admit-
ted in the main body of the European theory of human 
rights. However, speaking about emotions and suffering 
in the context of a theorisation on human rights should 
not be considered odd. On the contrary, a theory that 
deals with the individual and social effects of events like 
those of torture, mass killings and slaughter of entire 
peoples, but in which suffering is not a key concept, must 
face doubts about its comprehensiveness and its ability 
to grasp the core of the topic about which it is speaking. 
Human rights abuses are phenomena inextricably bound 
up with pain, distress and desperation. So, it comes as a 
surprise to discover that there is no antecedent in the 
classic European theories of rights of a central reference 
to the suffering of the victims of the state. No wonder 
that the suffering of the colonial victims of imperialism 
do not have a place in the hegemonic theory of rights.17
Within the ethos of the language of the violated, 
Baxi’s characterises the Third World as ‘the suffering hu-
manity’ (Baxi, 2002a, p. 113-114). In this notion the Third 
World is defi ned in terms of the pain it has endured 
over the centuries as a consequence of imperialism. Suf-
fering becomes in this rights discourse one of the cru-
cial aspects of the history of the Third World, a history 
of millions of individual lives turned to misery and de-
stroyed, and a tale of genocide of entire peoples. This is 
the suffering of individuals, the unbearable pain of a child 
torn to pieces and devoured by dogs; the infi nite pain of 
his mother, from whose breast he was pulled away. The 
concept of the ‘suffering humanity’ incarnates the few 
seconds or the long years in which the pain of the child 
and the mother was endured. We need to bring into 
consciousness this excruciating agony that has extended 
and multiplied across peoples and centuries. This is a 
suffering that permeates and taints the entire history of 
continents and our era. It is a pain that gets confounded 
with the spirit of the times. Speaking about how the 
twentieth century history of the European Jews can 
be summarised in the word ‘Auschwitz’, Lyotard (1997, 
p. 78) says that ‘there is a sort of grief in the Zeitgeist’. 
The agony evoked by the words ‘a suffering humanity’ is 
of this quality. It is an affl iction that evokes and convenes 
the torment of so many for so long. 
At the same time, the concept of ‘the suffering 
humanity’ reclaims the right of the victims of imperialist 
violence to incarnate humanity and to be human. The 
invocation of Humanism in the Renaissance was made 
in order to identify certain sorts of humans and peo-
ples and to exclude from these categories some other 
human beings, the barbari fi rst of all (Fitzpatrick, 2003, 
p. 439). In order to justify the conquest of America and 
the Third World and to guarantee the stability of the 
colonial world order, a conceptualisation of the ‘inhu-
manity’ of the colonised was constructed and has been 
re-elaborated again and again until the present. Juan de 
Sepúlveda denied a human quality to the Indians in a 
philosophically and theologically exquisite argumen-
tation, while the conquistadors referred to them as 
beasts. The marginalisation of the inhabitants of the 
Third World from the human species was accompanied 
by another strategy of segregation spelled out in the no 
less effective terms of race and their supposed inferior-
ity in relation to those coming from across the Atlantic. 
But humanity is not a property owned exclusively by 
Europeans or by the West, nor are the inhabitants of 
the Third World ‘less equal’ than the folks of the North 
and the West, as it is still held today by the prejudices 
that feed racism and xenophobia in ‘advanced’ societies. 
Against this background that extends and pollutes the 
17 Recently a very interesting attempt has been made at establishing a relationship between suffering and the theory of human rights from a European perspective. It 
starts out from the awareness of the absence of such an approach in the whole body of the European tradition of natural and human rights, and invites cultivation of 
memory and a sensibility towards the suffering of the Europeans and of ‘the others’, adopting pain as the common experience of all human beings. Notwithstanding, 
despite its intention of avoiding the habitual fl aw of a European thinking that claims to be universal while remaining unilateral and exclusive, this effort ends up falling 
into the same old skins as the suffering to which it refers is mainly that infl icted by nation-states in the history of Europe. Regrettably, memory of the suffering caused 
by the European empires does not have a place in this re-thinking of rights (see Gunther, 1999, p. 117-144).
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whole history of modernity, the expression ‘the suffer-
ing humanity’ reclaims humanity for the human species 
in its entirety, for the human as such. It does so in a pe-
culiar and idiosyncratic way, bringing into awareness the 
role and the vicissitudes the excluded humanity has had 
to endure since the beginning of modernity.
The Third World is a humanity that suffers be-
cause it has been, and continues to be, the victim of 
pillage and genocide. Nonetheless, positing the Third 
World as a victim does not imply its identifi cation with 
that condition, nor are the colonised identifi ed with the 
wound infl icted by the conquerors.18 The memory of 
the violence of the past and the denunciation of the 
abuses of the present, accompanied by a will to point 
to those responsible and to those who have been or 
are subjected to plunder and destruction, does not nec-
essarily mean colluding in a poignant and self-defeating 
process of victimisation of the Third World. Although an 
important part of its history, being a victim of genocide 
does not monopolize its past, the realities and the pos-
sibilities of the Third World. 
In addition, to point to the existence of a sus-
tained campaign of slaughter in modern history and to 
its victims does not necessarily lead to the conversion 
of those peoples into passive and submissive spectators 
of their own plight, or in masses waiting for redemption 
offered graciously by others. The subaltern is the victim, 
but those who have been converted into subalterns by 
the advance of imperialism are precisely the communi-
ties fi ghting for independence and against neo-colonial-
ism. A judgement on past history by a moral and political 
consciousness and the endeavour for taking to a halt 
such a display of cruelty ask for a thorough investigation 
of the manifold crimes and for a clarifi cation of who the 
perpetrators and the victims were19. For Dussel (1998, 
p. 311), to unveil or to discover the felonies of moder-
nity, and to point to the victims outlines an ‘ethical-crit-
ical consciousness’ and constitutes a fi rst step towards 
emancipation and the achievement of justice.
The telos of the theory and practice of human 
rights that emerges from the idea of a ‘suffering human-
ity’ resides in a commitment ‘to give voice to human suf-
fering, to make it visible’, an enabling step towards global 
political consciousness and to an historical engagement 
with ‘the alleviation of human misery and social suf-
fering’—of the suffering of hundreds of millions of the 
‘wretched of the earth’ (Baxi, 2002a, p. 3-4). A practice 
of human rights embedded in the ethos of the struggle 
for self-determination and independence is thus radi-
cally tied to the search to remove the conditions under 
which domination is exercised. There is a truly emanci-
patory sense at the core of the fi ght for human rights 
which, in the sphere of the neo-colonial world and glo-
balisation, can be spelled out in terms of resistance to 
imperialism and the search for global justice.20
If, to imagine a theory and practice of human 
rights we follow Baxi throughout his denunciation of 
the consequences of imperialism and thus we listen 
to the ‘tormented voices of the violated’ (Baxi, 2002a, 
p. 41), then the human rights culture becomes a re-
sponse to the plight of the humanity that suffers. But 
such an admittance of suffering requires a specifi c qual-
ity that gives proper and adequate answer and credence 
to the phenomenon with which it is dealing. Although a 
rational reaction and comprehension is not only feasible 
but also represents the standard rejoinder to human 
rights violations, a reply involving feelings or made in 
terms of the pain they involve is possible too and per-
haps more adequate. In this way the phenomenon of 
‘human sensibility’ (Baxi, 2002a, p. 41) is brought to the 
realm of human rights as a capacity for apprehending 
the world and as a force for human rights and moral 
progress. Sensibility alludes here to a feature of human 
beings that is as human as reason. Aristotle distinguished 
the human from the beasts by the faculty of reasoning, 
and modern subjectivism since Descartes has led to the 
enthronement of the identifi cation of reason with hu-
man nature. However, regardless of the endurance of 
the Aristotelian idea, nor the hegemony of a rational 
understanding of humanity in contemporary culture, we 
all can also agree with the common sense affi rmation 
according to which the humanity of human beings can 
be recognised by their capacity for sentiments.21
In speaking about sensibility as a competence for 
feeling emotions, Baxi (2002a, p. 41) is not only referring 
to an ability residing in individuals but also to a ‘moral 
collective sentiment’. In the framework of a meditation 
on human rights located in the horizon of the world-
system, the collective nature of the capacity for feel-
ings extends well beyond the borders of community 
and society. In a time of globalisation such a faculty has 
worldwide characteristics. In this way, Baxi postulates 
18 Sarah Ahmet (2004) has taken distance from the Subaltern perspective on the basis of a supposed identifi cation of the victim with the wound.
19 Within this rationale it is possible to say that a theory of human rights which refuses to speak about the victims or that precludes the possibilities of those damaged 
by violence to call themselves victims blinds itself to history, and conspires for the perpetuation of the culture of not allowing the voices of the violated to be heard.
20 In a similar sense, Baxi considers that the sense of postcolonial constitutionalism and law is that of being a site of resistance to ‘global economic constitutionalism’ 
(Baxi, 2005, p. 552).
21 It is the inability to build robots with feelings that largely allows distinguishing today between cyborgs and human beings.
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the existence of a ‘global affectivity’ with moral conse-
quences, or a ‘global moral sentiment’, which would be 
part of our contemporary global culture (Baxi, 2002a, 
p. 116). Such an idea points to a hidden or not yet prop-
erly recognised and thematised feature of contempo-
rary culture, a realm of emotions that pervades and 
traverses culture as a whole, and that remains present 
not only in the ambit of individual cities and nations. It 
relates to the phenomenon of the world culture, whose 
confi guration was born with the arrival of Columbus 
in America and the circumnavigation of the world, and 
whose contours and traits are beginning to emerge 
more clearly. The sorrow that marks the spirit of our 
times requires a new culture. The existence of a ‘suf-
fering humanity’ and the defence of its rights demand 
the strengthening of the capacity of the contemporary 
global and postmodern culture to take notice of that 
humanity and to be sensitive to that suffering. A human 
rights culture embedded in this global phenomenon of 
moral sensibility could contribute to enlarge the appeal 
of rights as political ideals and legal norms, and supple-
ment the fi ght for human dignity that is waged following 
the rules of rational political debate and criticism. 
Re-thinking human rights from the point of view 
of the subaltern does not only lead to the introduction 
of the language of the suffering of the victims of the 
Third World in the discourse of human rights, to the 
description of human rights culture as a web of emo-
tions and to the adoption of global sensibility as a res-
ervoir and a source for the struggle for human rights. 
The presence of a layer or a sphere of emotions in con-
temporary culture has not only cultural connotations 
but also moral ramifi cations. Thus, this re-interpretation 
of human rights also has to do with a re-thinking of 
the ethics of rights. The morality elaborated under the 
modern premises of reason needs to be complemented 
by a dialogue with an ethics that fi nds its content in this 
pool of emotions that is part of the global culture. For 
Baxi (2002a, p. 41), this new ethics is an ‘emerging global 
ethics [...] of movements of human solidarity’. 
A cannibalistic theory of Human Rights
For centuries the Europeans have denigrated the 
peoples of the Third World as barbarians. In the justifi -
cation of such an accusation the trope of the cannibal 
played a crucial role, becoming one of the main justifi -
cations for the mass murder that the war of conquest 
came to be: the cannibalistic peoples were precisely 
those in need of being civilised and their depravity and 
horrible sin justifi ed all the means to achieve such an 
end, including their extermination (Hulme, 1998, p. 14-
15).
But if we look at anthropophagi from the point 
of view of the peoples that practiced cannibalism as a 
custom, we could get a different picture. For the Wari, 
an Amazonian tribe that entered into contact with the 
modern world in the 1950s, burying was degrading and 
disrespectful to the dead, while horrifying and emotion-
ally troubling and sad for the relatives. Are we modern 
readers able to fi nd in the Wari a sentiment of a similar 
character but of opposite rationale to that which made 
Antigone to fi ght for the burying of her brother? At 
the time of the Conquest some of the native tribes 
used to eat those of their associates who died—out 
of a sort of sympathy for the deceased—whom they 
did not want to leave rambling around alone or rotting 
in the wet and dirty soil, as well as in order to lessen 
their sadness. They also used to eat their enemies in 
order to get the strength of their spirit (Conklin, 2001, 
p. xvii-xix, 32). It is likely that, in continuing with this 
well-established tradition, when the Spanish arrived in 
America some conquistadors and bishops have been 
eaten by the natives. 
In his 1928 ‘Anthropophagite Manifesto’, Oswald 
de Andrade embraced and transformed this claim into 
a positive principle and framed cannibalism as a method 
or cultural strategy for dealing with the European heri-
tage. The deglutition and devouring22 of European think-
ing combines an aggressive and a constructive attitude. 
It is, fi rst of all, a rebellion against the imposition and 
the impersonation of imperial intellectual models and 
ways of thinking, and the reproduction of their ideas. 
The mastication, swallowing and digestion of European 
culture allude to the critique to which European think-
ing is submitted: ‘The cannibal devours the coloniser se-
lectively and critically, producing a dialogical upsetting, a 
carnivalised movement of native and foreign cast’ (Per-
rone, 1996, p. 52). On the productive side there is the 
digestion or absorption of the European heritage, that 
feeds new intellectual processes and that results in its 
re-elaboration in the terms of a Third World perspec-
tive and gives impulse to an autonomous thinking. The 
complexity of such a process results in a non-naïve and 
22 Cannibalism is not completely strange to the European civilisation and philosophy anyway. This is not only because Europe has an ancient tradition of anthropophagi. 
Suspicions have already been expressed by Peter Fitzpatrick about the existence of commonalities between philosophical cannibalism and deconstruction, particularly 
regarding some aspects of the refl ection developed by Derrida in his ‘Politics of Friendship’ (1997). In this sense we can speak of the ‘deconstructive’ qualities of an-
thropophagic thinking, or about the ‘cannibal to come’ that resides in deconstruction.
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non-dualist process of cultural and philosophical syncre-
tism. In a similar sense, working on the ideas developed 
by Andrade, the Brazilian poet Haroldo de Campos 
spoke of a ‘transcultural anthropophagi’ as an emanci-
patory project that thinks ‘the national in its dialogical 
relationship with the universal’. De Campos included 
in this program of ‘transculturation’ the works of Latin 
American writers like Jorge Luis Borges and Octavio 
Paz (see Prado Bellei, 1998, p. 101). Thus, the consump-
tion or eating of the heritage of the dominant nations 
or empires becomes an anti-colonial act of intellectual 
emancipation.
Questions in place of a conclusion
The pain evoked by Baxi’s notion of a ‘suffering 
humanity’, which marks the spirit of our times, chal-
lenges the philosophical understanding of the Occident 
and necessitates a thought lively enough to ensure its 
apprehension. Can we hear the voice of the victims of 
colonialism? Is the contemporary consciousness sensi-
tive enough to register or to ‘grasp’ such a grief? Is rea-
son alone competent to give account of the spirit of the 
times we live in? Can the cold reason be ‘warmed up’ 
and softened? Is it redeemable? How to imagine a world 
guided not only by reason but also by the heart? How 
to think the existence of a culture of sentiments in the 
global geography in the midst of raging neo-colonialism 
and cold-blooded capitalism? In the context of the mod-
ern cultural and sociological conditions, how is it pos-
sible to cultivate and strengthen a culture of emotions? 
How we are going to imagine an ethics and a culture of 
human rights that respond to suffering humanity? How 
can an ethics of solidarity contribute to reinforce the 
contemporary, postmodern or decolonial global moral 
sentiment and to make the human rights culture more 
powerful? And what does ‘human solidarity’ mean in this 
context? This series of conjectures and questions guide 
this refl ection, but they remain open to be answered in 
new explorations.
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